Thursday, July 28, 2011

Over the past ten years....war has changed


War has changed, In Norway this past weekend the enemy came from within - a Norwegian citizen named Anders…

War was fought on the battlefields, in some far-off land to defend our countries and our principles, today the battlefield is in our streets, our homes, our places of work and on our public transport.

This change in the battlefield and the transformation of the enemy encourages us to look at how best to protect our civilians; we can no longer only determine the threat as an organization or group – but the weapons that they could use and the likelihood of the enemy choosing a specific weapon. The attacks in Norway on the 22 July 2011 were perpetrated by a Norwegian citizen with a Norwegian name – his weapons of choice were a car bomb of a few hundred kilograms made up of fertilizer and diesel fuel and an automatic rifle, weapons which he chose and designed in order to have the most effective impact.  With these two weapons he was able to murder more than 90 people and injure at least 100 more. As with the attacks on September 11th in New York, the Norway attacks were unexpected and something that the Norwegians will never forget – over 100 000 people attended the memorial march 48 hours after the attacks. The damage to the government buildings in Oslo was immense, business continuity was affected and the psyche of the Norwegian people was impacted.

The 2011 threat analysis written by the Norwegian Police Security Service (PST) based on Intelligence correctly reports that the threat of a terrorist attack is low, however we can no longer protect our citizens and communities by intelligence alone, we need to study the attack methods of this relatively new type of enemy and use physical security solutions and elements to mitigate the risks. We may not be able to prevent the attack but through the effective integration of protection into the designing of new buildings and upgrading the security of existing buildings, we will be able to mitigate the consequences. Sensitive installations like government buildings and complexes should have adequate physical protection methods which will not only lead to a more robust security but also create a deterrence which can prevent an attack.








The first step towards a safer society is to commission a threat and risk analysis. A threat and risk analysis quantifies and measures the actual threat and risk levels and thereby determines the vulnerability of an organization, building, community center, campsite and population. A threat and risk analysis should typically result in better understanding the challenges and protection requirements; the basis for the protection recommendations and the guide to planning and prioritizing protection measures.
There are many reasons to commission a threat and risk analysis study, but this should and must be the first step to understanding the level of the current protection and vulnerability. A threat and risk analysis will tell the following:
·         Which threats are relevant to the facility and how seriously they should be taken
·         For each of the threats, what are the risks to people and buildings and the continuity of business
·         The vulnerabilities in the current physical security (the building), technology or procedures
·         In which priorities the vulnerabilities should be addressed
·         Perfect vs. Practical protection – How one can improve protection within a budgetary framework.

The Norwegian Threat assessment by the Norwegian Police Security Service (PST) was written prior to the attacks of 22 July 2011. The assessment refers to terrorism and although it focuses mainly on Islamic extremism, it also covers extreme right wing threats and national extremism which at the time of the writing of this article seems to be the motive of the alleged terrorist.
The analysis states the following:
 “As in previous years, the far right and far left extremist communities will not pose a serious threat to Norwegian society in 2011. However, we have seen an increase in the level of activity within some of these groups during 2010, and some factors may increase this further. If strong leaders emerge in the far right extremist community, this could contribute the strengthening of recruitments to such groups. A stronger bond between Norwegian and foreign far right extremists could also contribute to the radicalization of some groups within the community. Furthermore, the activities of anti Islamic groups could cause confrontations which could contribute to an increased use of violence within far left extremist groups”.




The Norwegian threat assessment correctly notes the low likelihood of extremist activity, there are various organizations and politically motivated persons who follow extremist ideologies but the threat of an attack remains low. However, even if the threat is low…the consequences of a possible attack could be extremely high, and if a risk analysis was to be performed one would clearly see that if an attack occurred there could be damage to buildings, major casualties and an impact on the Norwegian society, by grading the threats and the risks and quantifying the results one will have a clear view of the vulnerabilities, and that even if the threat is very low the consequences could be very high and therefore preventative action needs to be taken.

Having intelligence on an actual terror group or organization is not what will determine the protection solutions of the building; it is what means the terrorist chooses to carry out the attack e.g. a car bomb, a placed explosive, a suicide bomber, CBRN and many various other means. We all know they have the intentions – the questions however are which threats are relevant, what are the motivations for an attack, what are the chances of the terrorist succeeding, and what weapons will the terrorist choose to use? In order to evaluate how a terrorist decides on his weapon of choice (the threat) we need to assess various criteria. Suggested criteria could be how easy it is for the terrorist to obtain a weapon, the operational ease and utilization of his chosen weapon, how easy will it be for the terrorist to perform reconnaissance and gather information and how accessible, vulnerable and attractive is the target.

The risk (consequence) analysis measures the risk once the attack has been perpetrated. Basic criteria relating to the consequences would be damage to the building and the potential of it collapsing, the amount of casualties, the recovery rate, the psychological impact on the citizens and the economic and political consequences.

The above criteria are then analyzed and graded. The grade will represent the level at which the specific threat scenario is considered a risk to the site and will in turn ensure cost effectiveness by defining protection recommendations through examining the expected outputs.



A threat and risk analysis will typically include: 
1.      Meeting with local security services to determine the relevant threats for a facility.
2.      Collecting data during site visits and interviews. In particular physical and budgetary constraints are identified and discussed.
3.      The risks represent the consequences for the structure, people and business once the threat has been carried out, and will be determined as a result of the combined experience of the physical security/blast mitigation consultant and computer modeling and simulation of the threat.
4.      Through a system of statistical analysis and weighting, and building on extensive knowledge of the consultant - the list of vulnerabilities in the current facility, systems and procedures will be identified and prioritized.
5.      A detailed report will be written and presented which will summarize these findings. These reports will be the basis for the development of a work plan and budget to implement security recommendations.


Protection solutions attempt to overcome the threats by creating a deterrence and professional security response, thereby eliminating certain modus operandi. There cannot be a 100% guarantee of overcoming a threat, therefore the main objective is to focus on mitigating the consequences in the event of an attack and to minimize the effects on people and property and to enable a rapid recovery. Utilizing a physical security consultancy with experience in directing and managing security operations in complex environments will ensure cost effective security solutions. To detect and deter potential terrorists or to mitigate the results of a successful attack, a holistic approach must be taken with regards to security. Only by considering all elements of a security plan both separately and together, can an effective level of security be provided within a cost effective budget. An effective security plan allows its security deployment to have three main capabilities: the ability to identify incoming attacks; the ability to alert the protected entities that attacks are impending; and the ability to quickly defeat such attacks, either at the reconnaissance stage or when they commence.
In order to achieve these capabilities the security plan needs to abide by the characteristics of the building/installation, its surrounding terrain and the perceived threat. To do so in a more efficient way the security plan needs to deploy a synergic combination of elements from all security domains (human, technical and structural) as no one domain by itself can provide a reasonable solution to the threats of  modern terrorism.




Car Bombs, suicide bombers, placed explosives and shootings are usually placed quite high on threat list due to these threats being the most utilized and effective worldwide. When a car bomb explodes the reason for the majority of casualties are debris and specifically shards of glass flying at speeds measured in milliseconds, severely harming everything in its path. The proper use of stand-off distance, anti ramming barriers and blast shielding walls may be effective in diminishing the blast load; in order to protect against glass fragmentation the solutions would include the lamination of all windows as a minimum and an energy absorption system against high blast loads. In cases of light curtain walls and building envelopes there are many blast mitigation elements to consider such as steel plating which can be retrofitted to an existing building. Proper access control procedures could deter a suicide bomber or the placing of an explosive device, and in most cases in Israel the suicide bomber explodes outside the building as he is deterred by the access control at the entrance. The use of blast protection windows and other mitigation solutions will minimize the effects of an explosion close to the premises. Adding blast resistant glazing and materials inside the building (in areas which are deemed to be sensitive) the risks to people inside would be minimized.

Protection solutions against shooting would begin with proper procedures, protection for people inside a building begin with access control procedures and the proper scanning for weapons, ballistic windows and doors to sensitive areas of the building or where VIPs are seated, or even the tinting of windows or the use of curtains so that the shooter cannot specifically aim at certain individuals.
Proper planning and implementation of protection solutions should ensure that buildings, compounds, campuses and all other areas incorporate innovative security solutions which are highly effective but usually inconspicuous. A good physical security consultant will match protection elements with available budgets resulting in cost effective solutions

One of the key advantages of a threat and risk analysis report is its ability to relate to a group of sites where the cost of fully protecting every individual building is prohibitive. By relating to the region as a whole, a threat and risk analysis project allows the highest risk areas to be identified and addressed.
The outcome or objective of the threat and risk analysis is to provide recommendations that maximize the protection of buildings, people, business continuity and integrity while still providing functionality and usability.

 We might not be able to stop the bomb from exploding, but we can certainly mitigate the results